1.1 Setting the Stage

"[I]n July 1906 a large group of [Iranian] people" according to Farrokh (2011), "engaged in a *Bast* (lit. seeking refuge, sanctuary) at the British embassy in Tehran. The Constitutional movement had looked to the British for support." (222)

In November 1979, a group of Iranian students took over the U.S. embassy in Tehran. These students called the U.S. embassy the 'center of signage' in Iran. The incident, well-known as the 'hostage crisis', dramatically altered the relations between Iran and the United States and triggered almost four decades of hostilities and mistrust between the two.

Taking place at the climax of two extremely intense moments in the history of modern Iran, these two *focal events*[1] highlight a fundamentally significant transition in the socio-political landscape of the country. Last four decades, similarly, have witnessed a significant shift in the studies on Iranian modern history, society, and politics in order to explain such a fundamental transition (Rajaee 2010; Katouzian 2006; Keddie and Richard 2003; Abrahamian 1982). Many scholars were in fact deeply bewildered with the 1979 Iranian revolution. Internationally well-known theorists of social movements and revolutions, too, were puzzled by 'the Iranian case'; the case that either was *unthinkable* (Kurzman 2009) or *exceptional* (Skacpol 1982). Exemplary to this sense of odd puzzlement was Skacpol's 1982 article, where she tries to deal with the Iranian 1979 revolution because it did not fit in any of her 1979 articulated models of revolutions (Skocpol 1979). Skacpol's article integrated a new dimension into her analysis of the great revolutions in France, Russia, and China: the ideological dimension. Since then, the ideological dimension has turned to be an integral part of any explanatory frameworks about social movements in Iran, as well as the Middle East, from Fred Holliday (1999) to Bayat (2013b) and Moghadam (2012) to mention a few.

The fall of the Communist block has resonated and amplified significance of the ideological dimension in the international relations, especially in the Middle Eastern studies. Step by step, culture and religion have turned into the most prominent conceptual frameworks in the Middle Eastern studies.

It is within this line of argumentation that Fawaz Gerges (1999), distinguished scholar in the Middle Eastern studies, argues that the 1979 Islamic Republic and the hostage crisis not only did fundamentally alter the Americans' perception of Iran, but significantly changed the western perceptions of Islam. Before the Islamic revolution of 1979, it was the Arab nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s, that had served as the main point of departure in describing and explaining most of the socio-political developments in the Middle Eastern societies. The Islamic revolutions in Iran altered such an environment. Gerges (1999) refers to a poll about the mainstream Americans' perceptions of Iran in

[1] The term is adopted from Durani and Charles (1992) who argue that focal events "cannot be properly understood, interpreted appropriately, or described in a relevant fashion, unless one looks beyond the event itself to other phenomena (for example cultural setting, speech situation, shared background assumption) within which the event is embedded, or alternatively that feature of the talk itself invoke particular background assumptions relevant to the organization of subsequent interaction." (3)

1981; according to which, "76 percent of the respondents indicated that they had a low opinion of Iran; 56 percent cited *hostage* as coming to mind when Iran was mentioned; after *Khomeini*, *oil*, and *the Shah*, many also cited *anger*, *hatred*, *turmoil*, and *troublesome country*." (43)

However, culture and religion were not the only sources of division. That is accurate to say that tensions between Iranian revolutionary government and the West, especially the U.S., reached its pick soon after the establishment of the Islamic government in Iran. One of the promises had already been made by the revolutionaries was to put an end to the 'foreign interferences' in Iran. To put an ending to the 'foreign interference', nonetheless, was not just the 1979 revolutionaries promise; rather, it had been indispensable part of Iranian social movements since the late 19th century. At the same time, the notion of independent Iran had implied different meanings for different political groups who were involved in the 1979 revolution. Amongst its different connotations, the term referred to the Russian and British direct and indirect interventions in the Iranian political and economic affairs during the 19th century, the British colonial interferences in the Iranian oil industry during the early 20th century, the emergence of the U.S. as a global power in the aftermath of the WWII with its direct contribution to the 1953 coup against the nationally elected government in Iran, a significant role that Iran carried out on the behalf of the U.S. during the Cold War in the Middle East, and the like.

Moreover, the second Pahlavi's[2] modernization project in Iran was under attack by many Iranians for being a 'westernization project'. It was seen as an imposed project aimed to weaken Iranians' religious and traditional lifestyle. Though the early 20th century modernization project was extremely welcomed by many Iranian intellectuals during the first Pahlavi era, in the eyes of many disenfranchised Iranians who had no share from the project during the second Pahlavi era, 'foreigners' and 'foreign interference' were assumed to be part of the country's socio-economic problems. The U.S. administrations' firm support of the second Pahlavi regime, therefore, brought different oppositional groups to the incumbent regime and anti-imperialist leftists guerrilla movements together.

The 1979 revolution, consequently, put an end to the Iran-US honeymoon. The hostage crisis triggered longstanding hostilities between the two. The newly formed Islamic republic's mistrust toward the U.S. went from bad to worse when the United States and his western allies backed the *Ba'ath* regime during the Iraqi invasion of Iran in the 1980s. Overlooked by the global powers, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against his own people and Iranians. Many other European powers either backed the U.S. position or remained silent.

The leader of the Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989), called the U.S. *Shaytan-e Bozaorg* [*the Great Satan*]. The current supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei (b. 1939), repeatedly argued that the U.S. administrations are not 'trustworthy'. He called the British 'evil' and the western powers 'arrogant imperialists.'

[2] The Pahlavi dynasty ruled Iran from 1925 until 1979. The period includes two kings: (a) Reza Shah or the First Pahlavi (r. 1925-1941); (b) Mohammad Reza Shah or the Second Pahlavi (r. 1941-1979).

Similarly, officials in Washington, too, accused the Iranian government as 'the biggest supporter of terrorism', axis of evil,[3] and a 'threat to the international security'. Apparently, from the U.S. perspective, Iran is not *an island of stability*[4] anymore.

Relations between Iran and the West rested in peace after the Iran-Iraq war for a short time, followed by another tumultuous decade after the disclosure of Iranian nuclear program. In 2015, the Iran nuclear deal was signed between the Islamic Republic and P5+1 (the UN Security Council's five permanent members, plus Germany). The deal prevented the Middle East from another bloody disaster, on the one hand, and opened diplomacy and direct talks between Iran and the U.S. after almost four decades. On May 8, 2018, Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of the United State from the deal to secure a 'new deal'. New sanctions have dismantled Iranian economy extremely since then but the results of the 2020 presidential election in the U.S. is promising a new set of diplomatic developments to be unfold between Iran and the United State.

Most of the protagonists of the Constitutional Revolution in the beginning of the 20th century, either religious or non-religious, saw the West as one of the main sources of inspiration for their social and political goals. The prominent socio-political leaders of the Constitutional Revolution were deeply influenced and even amazed by the Western economic development, its advanced political institutions, cultural and artistic advancements, and innovative political and philosophical thoughts. Nonetheless, in about seven decades, the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran significantly altered Iranian intellectuals' perceptions of the West.

What exactly did change between the two revolutions in the 20th century Iran that led to such an odd transition? We are aware of the increasing level of diplomatic relations between Iran and the western powers between the two revolutions (Milani 2011), increasing cooperation between Iran and the western countries especially in energy sectors; where, the West remained an important client for the Iranian oil and a significant foreign investors in Iran's oil industry (Elahee, Sadrieh, and Wilman 2015; Kruse 2014; Cooper 2011). These relations reached to the highest point during the 1970s. At the same time, the number of Iranian students who studied in the U.S. and Europe increased considerably (Abrahamian 2008) during this time. A significant increase in the number of the Iranians who visited Europe and the U.S. and worked there showed the high level of exchanges between Iran and the West. The same is evident in the case of the westerners who visited and worked in Iran (Amanat and Vejdani 2012). Economic relations, banking, and trades between Iran and the West, too, dramatically increased (Abrahamian 1982).

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[3] It was January 2002 when George Bush called Iran, Iraq, and North Korea 'axis of evil'. This rhetoric provided the base for the U.S-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

[4] During his visit to Tehran, Jimmy Carter made a speech and called Iran 'an island of stability'. His visit to Iran took place in December 1977. Nonetheless, the U.S. secret official documents reveal that between 1977-1981 in the Carter Administration another term to label Iran, alongside with Afghanistan, was the "Arc of Crisis". See: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/the_carter_administration_and_the_arc_of_crisis_1977-1981.pdf Accessed on 17 July 2016

Iran became the most important regional ally to the U.S-centred capitalist block during the Cold War (Alvandi 2014; Halliday 1986).

Observing these developments, one might speculate that most Iranians of the 1960s and 1970s, either lay people or intellectuals, would have cultivated more of a positive perspective toward the West. Contrariwise, they did not. Although there were, for instance, Iranian intellectuals who stated their supportive views of the West before the Islamic revolution, but an anti-western articulation of the West took the upper hand right before the Islamic Revolution. Such a critical articulation of the West is being reproduced[5] in Iran right now mostly by the state-sponsored *ideological apparatus* (Althusser 2008).

Throughout these two revolutions and in almost seven decades after the Constitutional Revolution, Iranian intellectuals' perceptions of the West, argues this research, transformed dramatically. Such a unique transition took shape within its own complex and multifaceted formation. Not only does not the simplistic Islam versus West framework help us to understand and explain such complexities, but it is in many aspects misleading. A comprehensive approach, coherent theoretically and methodologically, is needed to explain such a complex transition.

1.2 Problem Statement and Research Question

Within such a complex context of relations and perceptions between Iran and the West, Iranian intellectuals became one of the most influential social groups in shaping and reshaping Iranian internal (Shahibzadeh 2016; Kamrava 2008; Nabavi 2003; Mirsepassi 2000; Gheissari 1998) and international politics (Ridgeon 2013). After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, for instance, while the politicians from both western and Iranian sides were busy manufacturing harsh, hostile, and mostly confrontational discourses toward each other (Blight et al. 2012), lobbying and implementing boycotts and sanctions (Murray 2009), and channelling secret talks (Parsi 2007), Iranian intellectuals were engaged in a series of multifaceted and complex discursive battles, both domestically and internationally, to redefine the state-Iranians relations, on the one hand, and the relations between Iran and the world around in the international arena. Such intellectual engagements, argues this research, were core to the formation of the two revolutions in the 20th century Iran. Studies on the history of Iranian intellectualism reveal centrality of different intellectual figures and movements (Ridgeon 2013; Mirsepassi 2000; Tavakoli-Targhi 2001; Gheissari 1998; Boroujerdi 1996).

Moreover, reflections on the dynamics of Iranian domestic and international politics since the late 19th century reveal that Iranian intellectuals' articulations of the West gradually have re-shaped the West as Iran's *significant other* in the course of the 20th century (Shahibzadeh 2016; Elahee, Sadrieh, and Wilman 2015; Alvandi 2014; Bayat 2013; Cronin 2013; Ehteshami and Zweiri 2012; Katouzian 2009; Boroujerdi 1996). Such a *significant*

[5] By the term *reproduction*, argues Fairclough (1993), "I mean the mechanisms through which societies sustain social structures and social relations over time." (5)

other, played an *external point of reference* (Karolewski and Kaina 2006) for Iranians in order to (re)mark and (re)define boundaries of their social and political identities.

It is, therefore, commonly accepted amongst the scholars of Iranian modern history that Iranians came to face the West, primarily, in their 13-year-war against Russian Empire in the early 19th century[6] (Hunter 2014: 35; Matin 2013: 59; Rajaee 2010; Abrahamian 1982). This, of course, does not imply that before the Russo-Persian wars there had been no relations, familiarities, or encounters between the two. Indeed, there had been a considerable amount of commercial (Floor and Herzig 2015; Dale 2009), scientific-technological (Barnes and Parkin 2015), cultural (Keddie and Matthee 2011), and diplomatic (Keddie and Matthee 2011; Dale 2009) exchanges between the Iranian and European courts since the Safavid era. But in the historiography of modern Iran, the Russo-Persian wars turned into the Iranians' *awakening moment* (Pirzadeh 2016: 193; Ansari 2012: 41; Gheissari 1998: 94).

The West, according to these narratives, was central to such a *belated awakening*. Since this moment, the West has turned into a widespread obsession amongst Iranians, be it intellectuals and politicians or the ordinary Iranians. The West, in fact, has been turned into one of the mostly debated topics during the 1906 Constitutional Revolution and the 1979 Revolution. As Alastair Bonnett (2002) puts it thoughtfully:

> "People use 'the West' to articulate and structure their thoughts. It is a category, an intellectual resource, that helps map out the big picture; that gives coherence and statue to what, otherwise, can appear eclectic and tendentious opinion." (6)

Studies on the history of Iranian intellectualism reveal an ongoing battle amongst the four generations of Iranian intellectuals (Kamrava 2008) who have articulated the main socio-political concepts, including the West, in the Iranian socio-political sphere. These were articulated in the context of the three following orientations:

- Other Iranian intellectuals and their preferred notions of the West,
- The official discourse of Iranian states towards Wes; and,
- Dynamics of the International affairs.

In other words, Iranian intellectuals' articulations of the West have resulted from their simultaneous 'gazes inside' and 'gazes outside'. Gazing inside, as such, encompassed 'gazing towards other Iranian intellectuals' articulations of the West' and 'gazing toward Iranian state'. 'Gazing outside' encompassed mostly actions and reactions towards the western powers and their policies towards Iran.

In this background, while the so-called pro-Western intellectuals' articulations of the West had occupied the hegemonic position in the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, an anti-Western configuration of the West captured the upper hand in the 1979 Revolution.

[6] The first Russo-Persian War (1804-1813) in the 19th century ended with the Russians victory. According to the Treaty of *Golistan*, Persia lost northern parts of Armenia, all Georgia and Dagestan. The second war took place in 1826 and lasted for two years long. Ended by another sever defeat of the Persians in 1828, based on the Treaty of *Torkmenchay*, Persia lost all Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nakhichevan to Russia.

Gaining the upper-hand in the public eyes means occupying a hegemonic position in a society that takes place throughout a complex war over public consent (Hoare and Sperber 2015). In a multifaceted complex war over hearts and minds, anti-western intellectuals took the upper hand and marginalized other pro-western or alternative articulations of the West, e.g., leftist, nationalist, and liberal ones. This hegemonic status, as we know, belonged to the Islamists whose picture of the West was not a univocal articulation of the West, but an ambiguous, hybrid, and fluid one that, in practice, elaborated itself step-by-step mainly after the 1979 Revolution.

What happened between the two revolutions was, to borrow from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001), a hegemonic transition. Hegemony takes place, argues Anderson (2003), when a socio-political discourse is not fully determined. This openness enables different participants or actors to fix a desired formulation of the socio-political life through hegemonic battles. Fixations, though, are always temporal. Battles over hegemonic position signify "the never-concluded attempts to produce a fixed point of discourse, to which there will always be a threat." (Andersen 2003: VII) To gain a hegemonic position in a society, using Fairclough's words (1989), is an ongoing attempt to *denaturalize* the pre-existing socio-political order. (89) Denaturalization argues Gramsci (1971) takes place throughout hegemonic battles; battles that always involve two distinct positions: one position makes its way up and becomes *hegemonic* and the other occupies *the counter-hegemonic position.*

Iranian intellectuals' articulations of 'the West', also, were part of their ongoing and never-ending challenges, domestically and internationally, to overcome socio-political and economic problematics of the Iranian society. They at the same time were aimed to protect Iran from foreign invasions and colonial exploitations. Domestically, they were busy fighting an authoritarian despotism, a centralized statist apparatus, and socio-economicly decaying society. Meanwhile, they were trying to lead a nationally anti-colonial movement against direct and indirect interventions from the outside.

Iranian intellectuals' articulations of the West, needless to say, were not unique as such. Their articulations of the West stand alongside with the Buddhist and Christian nationalist intellectuals of the Meiji Japan (Snodgrass 2003), the Young Turks in the late Othman Empire (Turfan 2000; Kayali 1997), the Decembrists in Russia (Berman 1983) the religious reformists in the Muslim World (Nouryeh 2005; Kayali 1997; Lewis 1994) and the like. Ideas inspired by or driven from the West have always been disputed in these societies while, at the same time, they were sources of inspiration and contemplations for many intellectuals all over the world. The most prominent source of inspiration, here, was the 1789 French Revolution; that, for a long time, served as a role model all over the world, including the European thinkers themselves. The French Great Revolution significantly affected Iranian intellectuals (Tavakoli-Targhi 2001), as well as the 19th-century social movements all over the world (Forrest and Middell 2015).

Since the late 19th century, in fact, a considerable number of Iranian intellectuals actively have engaged in reflecting on the West. They, in practice, brought the West into the heart of their socio-political debates during, before, and after the revolution (Farzaneh 2015; Afary 1996). These efforts ended up with a diverse set of modalities, articulations,

and representations of the West in the late 19th and early 20th century Iranian intellectual landscape. These articulations and their historical context share three main following characteristics:

- The West and hegemonic battles over its representations or articulations were integral to the two grand revolutions in the 20th century Iran (Kamrava 2008; Vahdat 2002; Mirsepassi 2000; Boroujerdi 1996);
- Directly engaged in the hegemonic battles over the articulations of the West, Iranian intellectuals played a considerably crucial role in these critical moments (Mirsepassi 2010; Abrahamian 2008; Jahanbegloo 2004; Keddie and Richard 2003; Dabashi 1993); and,
- The West was, and still is, one of the most significant elements in the discursive articulations of socio-political issues in the Iranian society and its intellectuals' mindset (Vahdat 2002; Boroujerdi 1996; Gheissari 1998).

In this background, two main questions that this research is aimed to reflect on are: How did two different articulations of the West take upper hand amongst the Iranian intellectuals during two grand revolutions in the 20th century Iran? and why have those articulations been challenged later?

To answer these analytical questions, the research provides a genealogical account on intellectual articulations before, during, and after the Constitutional and the 1979 Revolutions. It situates the West as a body of discursive articulations within the history of modern Iran. By doing so, this research identifies two primarily influential political sites that have participated in the articulations of ideas during two grand revolutions in the 20th century Iran: (a) the internal actors, and (b) the international forces. Amongst the internal actors, the research is focused on battles between officially state-oriented forces, on the one hand, and Iranian intellectuals of different political affiliations, on the other. The state-oriented official discourses of the West in Iran, indeed, have been multiple and diverse but since the focus of the current research is directed, mainly, towards the Iranian intellectuals, the official discourse has been limited to the Iranian top political leaders' articulations of the West. Moreover, Iranian intellectuals' different political affiliations have affected their conceptions of the West. Therefore, there articulations of the West, too, are analyzed according to their political affiliations, e.g., leftist, nationalist, liberal, and Islamist ones. Drawing on such hegemonic battles, both domestically and internationally, the research analyses an immanent transition in the Iranian intellectuals' articulations of the West between the two revolutions.

1.3 Research Objectives

Technological developments of the late 20th century promised an interconnected global village (McLuhan and Powers 1989) on the one hand, and a network society (Castells 2000), on the other. Alongside with this, declaration of the triumphal of the liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1992) by the end of the Cold War, promised an intimate world for the new millennium. But the new millennium is witnessing severe divisions, separations, and disagreements globally.

In the case of the Middle Eastern countries, there exist no promising days on the horizon, both domestically and internationally. In the aftermath of the 9/11, the old West-East dichotomy is now returning more strongly, though in a new face. Scholars from different disciplines are trying to make sense of the age of 'war on terror'. Apart from insights and reflections that one might can borrow from these studies, surprisingly a new stereotype has been created in most of the studies: it seems that in most of these studies, history begins by 9/11.

Meanwhile, after a promising boom of *globalization* (Robertson 1992; Robertson and White 2003), the post-9/11 ear has witnessed an increasing desire for nationalism and radical national sovereignty. Increasing polarizations, thus, is taking shape in the international arena. The 2003 invasion of Iraq by the U.S. troops, the 2008 financial crisis, failed revolutions in the Arab World that led to a set of bloody civil and proxy wars in Libya and Syria, immigration 'crisis' in Europe, Brexit, the rise of far-right parties in Europe and the rise of Donald Trump in the U.S. are symptoms of an internationally chaotic atmosphere; where, international institutions such as the UN cannot function properly anymore. Such problematic issues have turned the focus of scholarly attempts in political science and sociology towards states and state-backed actors as the main players in national and international levels.

But this research detaches itself from these approaches. It, first and foremost, goes back into the heart of history and builds up its arguments within a historical framework. Moreover, it is mainly focused on non-state actors, namely Iranian intellectuals. This does not mean that it neglects roles carried out by the states. On the contrary, the research includes states in its analyses, but it does not limit itself to *statism*.

In this background, by focusing on four generations of Iranian intellectuals' hegemonic battles over the West, this research is aimed to reflect on a fundamentally significant transition in the articulations of the West in the 20th century Iran. This transition took place between the first and third generations of Iranian intellectuals. Dealing with this analytical task is the main objective of this research. The research carries out this task genealogically by analysing different articulations of the West amongst main intellectual groups at the first level. Then it moves to explain how and why a certain articulation of the West gained hegemony over the others. Moreover, the research draws on the second generation of Iranian intellectuals' articulation of the West as an intermediary phase. It, at the same time, moves beyond the third generation of Iranian intellectuals by analysing the fourth generation of Iranian intellectuals' contributions to the articulations of the West as an ongoing project. The second and fourth generations of Iranian intellectuals' articulations of the West are relevant to be included in this research because of the genealogically genuine challenges, modifications, and alterations they posed against their predecessors' discursive articulations of the West.

The research, hence, reflects on a long-standing tradition carried out by the prominent members of these intellectuals. This sheds light on a set of multilayered 'struggles and battles' over 'hegemony' in the history of modern Iran. Such a critical tradition, meanwhile, reveals itself in intertextualities, multiplicities, diversities, and contingencies of what Iranian intellectuals perceived as the West. The research, in other words, stresses

on the interconnectedness of discourses, historical uniqueness of intellectual articulations, and historical contingencies in order to problematizes dichotomous thoughts such as secular versus religious, modern against traditional, and more importantly western against eastern. An in-depth (inter)textual analysis of the works of Iranian intellectuals provides this research with these intellectuals' diverse and multiple articulations of the West in its plural form, i.e., *Wests*, to go beyond a unified, single perception of the West. Throughout a multidimensional historical analysis, the research addresses an immanent transition in these articulations based on the intellectuals' political affiliations, international settings, and changing discursive articulations of the West according to the Iranian states' transforming relations with the western powers. For instance, a pro-western intellectuals' articulation of the West during the Constitutional Revolution defined itself against an authoritarian Qajar monarch and his court by stressing on the adoption of the western institutions in Iran. These intellectuals' *strategic* approach, in fact, was aimed to impose limitations on the court's absolute power. Thus, a western style of 'rule of law' became an integral part of the intellectual and public debates during the early 20th century Iranian intellectualism. These intellectuals' articulation of the West was designed to depict the West as an ideal land of order and justice; where, Iranians would have followed as a model. The third generation of Iranian intellectuals' 'anti-western' position, on the contrary, was part of their *strategy* to mobilize the masses against the Second Pahlavi who had constantly violated the constitutional law under its modernization project.

As Denzin and Lincoln (2005) stated, qualitative research is "[an] attempt to make sense of, or to interpret, a phenomenon in terms of the meaning people bring to them." (3) Meanwhile, analysing the West through the eyes of Naser al-Din Shah, Reza Shah (the First Pahlavi), Mohammad Reza Shah (the Second Pahlavi), and Ayatollah Khomeini, provides this research with the official discourses of the West in Iran. Dealing with the official discursive articulations of the West is to make sense of the ways in which these political leaders had contemplated about the West. Their articulations of the West were embedded within a complex set of international relations in the 20th century Iran. Here, the research contextualizes Iranian intellectuals' articulations of the West within such an interrelated set of discourses. Moreover, key internationally significant events such as two World Wars, the Cold War, and the like provide this research with its international context.

It is worth emphasizing that this research uses these stages as more of a set of interconnected and interactive processes. In other words, the research is aimed to reflect on a set of interconnected *field of forces* (Bourdieu 1998). As a historically multi-layered genealogical account, this inquiry moves on the threshold of a variety of disciplines including political science, international relations, post-colonial studies, and history. Therefore, providing a multi-disciplinary account on Iranian intellectualism is another objective of this research.

Another important objective of this research is to connect empirical analyses on Iranian intellectualism with a theoretical endeavour. Theoretically, this research is built upon theories on intellectualism and postcolonial studies. Through a detailed analysis of the

theory of Occidentalism, the research re-articulates Edward Said's theory of orientalism in a new set of theoretical and methodological cluster: *Occidentalism* [see Chapter two]. This new theoretical orientation opens a new direction to reflect on Iranian intellectual history, politics, and history in the 20th century. Orientalism and Occidentalism are two functional and relevant toolboxes that have almost been absent from the studies on Iranian intellectualism. This research reflects on concepts such as the *strategic* and *official* Occidentalism(s) in order to advance its conceptual and analytical tools in answering its main question. Therefore, one of the main objectives of this research is to contribute, theoretically, to the newly emerging field of Occidentalism in Iranian studies.

It is in this theoretical background that this research moves beyond both Eurocentric and Orientalist approaches. As inherently deterministic-reductionist approaches, Orientalism and Eurocentrism, constantly, have reduced 'thinking' in the peripheral societies such as Iran to a handful of selected figures who '(re)confirm' stereotypical images of the Orient. Accordingly, the dominant Orientalist-Eurocentric discourses 'select' intellectuals from Iran or India, for instance, who fit the existing Orientalist-Eurocentric framework. In the case of Iran, Jalal-e Al-e Ahmad (1923-1969) is the *sweetheart* of the Orientalist-Eurocentric perspective. For Buruma and Margalit (2005), Al-e Ahmad's idea of *Westoxication* represents the West's lethal and bloody enemy's permanent hostility. The same figure for Bonnett (2004) represents an *apocalyptic dystopian thinker* from the Orient who paved the road for Islamism in the Middle East.

Does this mean we should not talk about Al-e Ahmad? Of course, not. This research does not neglect Al-e Ahmad and his seminal works in the Iranian Occidentalism. Nor does it claim that he was not an influential character in the history of Iranian intellectualism. Because of his importance, he is included in this research; therefore, this research critically engages with his ideas. But the Eurocentric and Orientalist discourses does not limit their scope of analysis just to a handful of Iranian intellectuals but, at the same time, they pick a certain part of these selected intellectuals' works that are extreme, polemic, and bold. In their selective cherry-picking approach, there is no place to any other Iranian intellectual who critically engaged with Al-e Ahmad's *'clumsy'* ideas of the West as if the critique of an eastern voice exclusively comes from the West, as if there has been no Iranian intellectual at all who might have criticized Al-e Ahmad. Well, indeed there was. Exemplary in this line of argumentation is Al-e Ahmad's close friend Dariush Ashuri (b. 1938) who wrote extensively on Al-e Ahmad's idea of the West. In fact, the first critique of *'Westoxication'* was published right after the publication of the Al-e Ahmad's work not in the U.S. or Europe but in Iran by Ashori. Dominant Eurocentric discourse cites and recites Al-e Ahmad extensively, while it does not even bother to mention Ashuri. Why? Since Ashuri does not fit in the Eurocentric-Orientalist narration, thus, he has been excluded from the scholarly debates on Al-e Ahmad's Occidentalism. This research is aimed to include such an excluded voice here. But Eurocentric and Orientalist discourses do not care about figures such as Ashuri and the dynamics within Iranian intellectualism. Can an oriental self-reflect? A 'yes' to this question, too, can question the foundations of the Orientalist discourse; according to which, the image of an oriental as a fundamentalist

other has been carefully crafted for centuries (Said, 1978). Thus, beneath the lines of this research, one might notice an absurd whisper, repeating: Yes, an oriental can speak.[7]

1.4 Defining the Main Themes of the Research

The following section defines the main themes of the research. All these themes are discussed in length throughout the next two chapters within their historical and conceptual contexts.

1.4.1 An Intellectual

There is no fixed, ultimate definition of an intellectual. Since "identity is always *relationally* organized" (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 43 emphasis in original), an intellectual, too, is embedded in a set of social relations. It is, to use Laclau and Mouffe's terms (1985), 'a subject position' within discursive relations. Like any other position(s) such as being a teacher, a mother, an activist, and the like, 'an intellectual' is, too, defined by a set of socially and historically constituted relations. Within these relations, certain expectations from an intellectual are being built on the one hand, and a certain set of roles are being carried out by an intellectual, on the other. These expectations, positions, and roles are not, though, fixed rather fluid, changing, and in transition.

According to the above-mentioned premises, among a variety of definitions that one might find in the literature, Edward Said's definition of an intellectual is the closest articulation of this concept. For Said (1996) an intellectual is "an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as, a public." (11) This definition draws on the discursive characteristics of an intellectual; accordingly, an intellectual is a social construct, embedded within a set of social relations, and plays specific roles in certain societies.

1.4.2 Hegemony

Fairclough (1993) provides a simple and straight definition of hegemony. Accordingly, hegemony is "a mode of domination which is based upon alliances, the incorporation of subordinated groups, and the generation of consent." (9-10) Hegemonies, accordingly, are produced, reproduced, contested, and transformed in discourses. The theory of hegemony, according to Fairclough (1995) highlights both how power relations constrain and control productivity and creativity in a discursive practice on the one hand, and the ways in which a relatively stabilized configuration of a discursive practice constitutes a specific form of social reality. Fairclough clearly argues that hegemony is a process.

[7] Paraphrased from Gayatri Spivak's seminal article's title 'Can the Subaltern Speak?', published in 1988. For an insightful account on the article, its revised version, and the following debates on Spivak's articulation of the *subaltern* alongside with her distinct position within the Subaltern studies, see: ***Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the History of an Idea*** (Morris 2010)

Hegemony, before Gramsci, was mainly debated in an economic term, implying cooperation between members of a certain group. It was Gramsci who tied the concept into more social and political dimensions to relate hegemony to the fundamental Marxist notion of social class. In order to 'explain' the complexity of the process of hegemony, Gramsci argues that solidarity between certain social class results from its class consciousness (Gramsci, 1971). Gramsci's critique is directed to a classical Marxist illusion that identities would be fully determined through a class analysis (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). Gramsci puts the notion of 'constituted hegemonic identities' in the core of his analysis to deal with such analytical fallacies.

Gramsci's brilliant and extraordinary contribution to the articulation of hegemony set the concept free from a mere economic determinism of Marxist reductionism but remained within the class struggle framework. It was, in fact, Laclau and Mouffe's work (2001) that moved hegemony as an analytical tool one more step forward and provided it with an enrich discursive dimension of analysis. Hegemony, according to Laclau and Mouffe (2001) should be perceived as an ongoing process since 'there is no finalized total unity' in the social. Hegemony, we need to clarify, constructs "the very identity of social agents, and not just a rationalist coincidence of 'interests' among reconstituted agents." (58)

1.4.3 Genealogy

In his seminal work on power, argues Foucault (2000):

> "One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework, and this is what I call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history." (118)

Therefore, what Foucault calls genealogy, is an historical analysis focused on a set of certain relations that have created specific subjects within a power network. A genealogist, accordingly, writes what Foucault calls an *effective history*; a history, that, its main concern is the present. It, at the same time, questions all social relations that have been considered natural or evident. A genealogical question – that Foucault (1998) calls it *problematization* – is aimed to "refuse the certainty of absolutes" (379) in order to trace particularities or rationalities of discursive formations, how they transform, and the way in which certain subjects are produced. Unlike traditional historicism that is based on continuity, genealogy "finds difference in multiple practices of power, organizing practices that are themselves engaged in a conflict of interpretations in so far as efforts by one side to order the other are met by resistance and counter-strategies." (Falzon, 2013: 291) [For details see Chapter three].

1.4.4 The West

The West [with capital W] is perceived in this research as a discursive articulation that condenses a broad range of socio-political meanings. It is a geopolitical concept that goes beyond its mere directional-geographical denotation [referred in this research by 'west' in lowercase]. In other words, the West, here, as a discursive articulation, "comprise[s] an undecided abundance of meaning, a concentration of meaning, which makes [it] ambiguous." (Andersen 2003: VI) Precisely that is its ambiguity which establishes a space of signification; a space that provided this concept with hybridity and ambiguity to be transformed through the time, historically, and spatially. In Chapter two, this research reviews the West's historical transitional meanings in the course of history, on the one hand, and its meanings in different societies, from Japan to Russia. Such diverse and multi-layered characteristics, argues Anderson (2003), provide possibilities for different articulations. Such an openness, consequently, has turned this concept to a contested notion within different societies all over the world.

To engage with the West as a discursive articulation, thus, is to be concerned about historical and social processes within which a certain form of articulation of this concept took shape. In this line of argumentations, the West according to Jorgenson and Philips (2002), is a social space that links "a geographical part of the world to, for instance, civilization, white people, the Christian church and liberal democratic institutions." (50)

1.4.5 Discourse Theory and Articulations

Discourse Theory (DT) provides systematic conceptual framework to analytically deal with the discourses. There conceptual frameworks contain the following components: articulation, moments, element, the field of discursivity, nodal point, and hegemonic struggles. Certain terms of the DT that have been adopted in this research are:

- ***Articulation*** is any practice that establishes "a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice." (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 105)
- ***Discourse***, in this methodological approach, is "an attempt to stop the sliding of the signs in relation to one another and hence to create a unified system of meaning." (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 27)
- A ***nodal point*** is "a privileged sign around which the other signs are ordered; the other signs acquire their meaning from their relationship to the nodal point. In medical discourses, for example, 'the body' is a nodal point around which many other meanings are crystallized." (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 26)

As Jorgenson and Philips (2002) argue, "nodal points organise discourses (for example, 'liberal democracy'), master signifiers organise identity (for example, 'man'), and myths organise a social space (for example, 'the West' or 'society')." (p. 50) By linking these moments to each other, through what Laclau and Mouffe (1985) coined 'the logic of

equivalence', a variety of contingencies are connected. The result is a '*myth*' that naturalizes a contingent chain of significations.
At the same time, "the West stands in opposition to the reset of the world which is not automatically accepted as civilised and democratic", argue Jorgensen and Philips (2002), "but rather defined "as 'barbaric' and 'coloured'." (p. 50)

1.5 Iranian Intellectuals in Context; A Primary Typology

Goudarzi (2008) summarizes inquiries on Iranian intellectual studies. He identifies seven categories in the field. Although there is no single best categorization in the field, a critical analysis on Goudarzi's illuminating classification is presented to open a comprehensive discussion on classification and periodization of Iranian intellectualism throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.

1. The first category Goudarzi introduces is based on class orientations and social bases. Here, Iranian intellectuals are generally divided into (a) the late 19th century upper-class Intellectuals; (b) the early 20th century middle-class intellectuals; and (c) intellectuals of the second half of the 20th century with mixed social bases and backgrounds. Scholars who have based their inquiries on this categorization, in fact, reduced and simplified varieties of socially and economically different sets of Iranian intellectualism in the late 19th century and early 20th century into the three abovementioned groups, on the one hand, and at the same time neglected the dynamics of contributions and contradictions driven from intellectuals' of different socio-political backgrounds when they came together and formed single front in their political activism.
   More importantly, due to the historically '*non-European*' mode of economic development in Iran, class formations in Iran did not necessarily follow the European class categorizations (Matin 2013; Chaqueri 2011; Vali 1993). Accordingly, class-based analyses of Iranian intellectualism should consider a great deal of modifications in order to produce a valid analysis.
2. The second model of classification of Iranian intellectuals is based on to their school of thoughts. Here, Iranian intellectuals according to Goudarzi are generally divided into two main categories of (a) Russian-style intellectuals; (b) European-style intellectuals. While members of the former category were more radical in their thoughts and deeds, members of the latter desired and followed more pragmatic and step-by-step reformist agenda. This category, too, does not provide a comprehensive perspective for analyses for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is Eurocentric as such and, consequently, neglects any possible non-European sources of intellectual inspirations amongst Iranian intellectuals. Secondly, it simplifies dynamics and exchanges between the two categories by setting them in as an absolute dualistic fashion.
3. Historical chronologies provide foundations of the next form of categorizations. Here, scholars mostly were identified differently according to the significance of the historical moments they lived in. For instance, the Constitutional Revolution

(1905-6) and Islamic Revolution (1979) are, without any doubt, two key moments that researchers of the contemporary Iranian history base their analyses up on (Abrahamian 1982; Keddie and Richard 2003). Moreover, some scholars put a greater emphasis on the 1954 coup (Katouzian 2009) while others, recently, focus on the year 1988 when the Iraq-Iran came to its end (Abrahamian 2008). Recent analyses about Iranian politics and history are mostly designed around the year 2015 as a new 'turning point' when *the Iran deal* was signed (Gaietta 2016; Simpson 2015; Entessar and Afrasiabi 2015). In each case, a certain historical moment cast shadow on the event before and after. As Sohrabi (2018) in her thoughtful analysis on the historiography of the 1979 Iranian revolution argues aptly that many of analyses on this subject suffer a "problem space", leading them to follow a prevailing positivist approach in historiography that ultimately ended up with marginalizing events and incidents that have had no direct connections or impacts in the 1979 revolution.

4. Classification according to the intellectual generations was another way to reflect on Iranian intellectualism. Ramin Jahanbagloo (b. 1956), a distinguished Iranian intellectual and philosopher of the University of Toronto, provided a useful categorization on Iranian intellectualism based on the notion of generation. Four generations of Iranian intellectuals, according to Jahanbagloo (2004), are (a) those who emerged before and during the Constitutional Revolution; (b) those who witnessed/accompanied nation-building project of the First Pahlavi; (c) those who emerged before the Islamic Revolution in 1979; and (d) those who emerged after the Islamic Revolution.

   The categorization, here, uses the term 'generation' not in its sociological meaning, rather historically. This form of categorization, in fact, is more of a historical chronology. Nonetheless, Jahanbagloo's generational categorization fits many historical and social developments in the history of modern Iran and thus analytically provides a very useful tool to reflect on Iranian intellectualism during the late 19th and through the 20th centuries.

5. Iranian intellectuals' position toward modernity provides the fifth form of categorization here. As a common and widespread style of categorization, it divides Iranian intellectuals into three following groups: (a) anti-modernity and anti-West intellectuals; (b) pro-modernity and pro-West ones; and (c) those intellectuals who occupy a middle ground. Exemplary in this line of inquiries is Mirsepassi's ***Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran (2000)*** and ***Democracy in Modern Iran: Islam, Culture, and Political Change (2010)***.

6. Centrality of religion in an intellectual agenda or trend in the history of modern Iran provides the next criteria to categorize intellectualism in Iran. A dominant categorizing approach, here, divides Iranian intellectuals into (a) those who think and write in accord with a secular paradigm; (b) those who remain within a religious framework. Duality of secular/religious notion, here, has pushed analyses to neglect exchanges and interconnectedness between the two. Such a

simplistic approach, at the same time, neglected historical dynamics of the contemporary social movements in Iran since the late 19th century; thus, in cases such as the 1979 revolution, it provided no analytically 'hybrid' explanations one the one hand, and labeled such an intrinsically mixed event 'exceptional' or 'unthinkable'.

7. Intellectual positions or stands toward/against the state provide us with the final form of categorization according to Goudarzi (2008). Focused on the state-intellectual relation, here exist two main categories:
   (a) pro-establishment intellectuals (traditional intellectual) and,
   (b) counter-establishment intellectuals (organic intellectuals), in Gramscian sense.

Clearly, the above-mentioned categories overlap. For instance, chronological and generational categorizations have a lot in common. Intellectuals' positions toward modernity are mostly in tandem with their position towards or against religion. Nonetheless, categorizations must also be justified according to their analytical, methodological, and theoretical capacities in order to systematically serve a given research project. In other words, it is the question of a research that sets the foundation of categorization or periodization that it adopts to follow. These is, at the meantime, an inherent connection between critique and crisis and since every problematization is a form of critique, an inquiry must be able to establish such connections properly. Turner (1994) has proposed a proper articulation in this regard.

An intelligentsia, especially a radical one, argues Turner (1994), is typically a by-product of a crisis. Such a crisis is, basically, resulted from major structural transformations of society. These structural transformations, according to Turner, are likely to be the consequence of massive class conflict, military takeover, economic collapse, or a major natural disaster resulting in epidemics and famine. What Turner (1994) calls *catastrophic events*, "pose a major threat to the continuity of national culture, call forth and constitute a national intelligentsia. Under such crisis conditions, an intellectual stratum may become a self-conscious, committed and coherent intelligentsia." (155)

In this line of argumentations, this research claims that two major politically significant moments in the history of Iranian modern history were symptoms of much more major crises in Iranian society and politics. Borrowing from Gramsci, a set of 'organic crises' led to these two major revolutions in the 20th century Iran. Laclau (1996) coins the same process the "social crisis." (64) In both cases, either we call it an organic crisis or social crisis, political movements have been designed to overcome a set of certain socio-political problematics or crises within the society.

The two above-mentioned revolutions, at the same time, have divided Iranian modern history in four distinct though still interconnected segments: (a) before the Constitutional Revolution and (b) after that, (c) before the 1979 Revolution, and (d) after that. The period between the two revolutions, as we see, is being divided into two segments in many contemporary historiographies: the first Pahlavi and the second Pahlavi rules. Accordingly, this research alongside with Jahanbagloo (2004) and Kamrava (2008) argues that such chronological categorization provides inquiries on Iranian intellectualism with an enriched analytical capacity to compare Iranian intellectualism within Iranian political